We give a Kripke-style semantics for the intuitionistic logic of pragmatics ILP and show completeness with respect to this semantics. In order to prove the completeness theorem we give a decision procedure that given an ILPsequent , either returns a cut-free derivation of or constructs a finite counter-model if is not provable. Thus we have the finite model property and also a new proof that the cut rule is eliminable in ILP.
Introduction

Principles of the logic of pragmatics
The philosophical context
The project of a formal pragmatics, introduced by Dalla Pozza and Garola [6] , arises in philosophical logic and aims at resolving the conflict between classical and intuitionistic logic by presenting the latter as an extension or integration of the former, rather than an alternative to it. Dalla Pozza and Garola take off from Frege's distinction between propositions and judgements: the former are entities which can be true or false; the latter are acts which have a propositional content but are justified or unjustified (in given contexts) rather than true or false. In Frege's notation [8] , a judgement expresses the act of asserting that is true, while a proposition expresses the content of the act of assertion. Frege noticed that as a consequence 1. there can be no nested occurrences of , and 2. truth-functional connectives don't apply to expressions of judgements.
But what counts as a justification of an act of judgement ? If is a nonmathematical sentence then is justified by some kind of evidence that is true. If is a mathematical sentence then is justified by a proof that is true. Furthermore, a necessary and sufficient condition to infer an assertion from an assertion is that there exists a method which transforms a proof [evidence] of into a proof [evidence] of . The existence of such a method justifies the implication , which is therefore intuitionistic implication. From these considerations Dalla Pozza and Garola argue that intuitionistic logic, as a logic of judgements, has a different subject matter from classical logic, as the logic of propositions.
Why is the specific content of intuitionistic logic characterized as formal pragmatics? The operation by which a proposition is transformed into an act of assertion may be regarded as an illocutionary operator in the sense of Austin [1] ; by the above considerations, intuitionistic logic is about the logical properties of such an operator. In [5] the framework has been extended to a logic of judgements and norms: here the act setting the obligation to bring about (the state of affairs described by the proposition) is expressed by ; the resulting formal system may be regarded as an axiomatization of the logical properties of the illocutionary operator of obligation.
It could be objected that every act of assertion or of obligation is performed by a subject in a given state of information and situation; indeed one of the main functions of pragmatics in linguistic theory is to fix the context for a semantic interpretation of an expression. In general norms are valid within a normative system : this dependance could be expressed by the notation . Although a fully developed formal pragmatics should characterize the properties of relativized judgements and obligations, it is legitimate to develop first a theory of the properties of the operators which hold abstracting from particular subjects and situations: in particular expresses an impersonal act of judgement and expresses a norm which is valid in every rational normative system.
A more subtle issue can be raised about the status of molecular formulas and pragmatic connectives. If and express an illocutionary act, does the conjunction express a composite act or a relation between acts? The paper [6] does not answer this question; however, since a relation between acts may be regarded as a binary function which returns a truth-value, the interpretation of molecular expressions as acts seems inescapable. We cannot further discuss the issue here.
Therefore in [6, 5] the language of formal pragmatics and its semantics are as follows:
1. Radical formulas are of the form where ranges over an infinite set of propositional letters and , , and are the usual classical connectives; radical formulas are interpreted according to Tarski's semantics. 2. Elementary formulas are of the form where and are signs of illocutionary force and the symbol stands for an illocutionary act which is never justified. 3. Sentential formulas are of the form where , and are the pragmatic connectives interpreted according to Heyting's semantics of proofs.
What are the relations between the different layers of the formal system for pragmatics? How does one prove that an intuitionistic pragmatics is compatible with classical semantics? A partial answer is given by Gödel [9] , McKinsey and Tarski's [14] interpretation of intuitionistic logic into the classical modal system S4 in [6] . Namely, one extends the radical part of the language with the following grammar:
When the elementary formulas include an operator of obligation [5] , then the radical part is also extended with a modal operator ' ', which is given Kripke's semantics for KD (on frames without terminal points). As the deontic expression belongs to an intuitionistic sentential language, the modal translation must be as follows:
According to [5] , the modal interpretation of the elementary formulas establishes a relation between the expressive use and the descriptive use of the operators of illocutionary force and thus of the whole pragmatic language: a Tarskian semantics can be assigned to the pragmatic language only in its descriptive use, not in its expressive use. The existence of a correspondence between the expressive use and the descriptive use of the pragmatic language does not justify the claim that the latter fully represents the former; in particular it does not rule out the possibility that the expressive use may be more adequately represented by other mathematical constructions (such as computational, categorical, game-theoretical interpretations of intuitionistic logic) and that Kripke's semantics may be a kind of abstract interpretation of the whole pragmatic system.
The intuitionistic fragment of the language is obtained by restricting the class of elementary formulas to those with atomic radical only. In addition to the projection of the whole pragmatic system down to the semantic level, given by the modal interpretation, one would also expect an inverse action of the semantic level on the pragmatic level, which would certainly provide a stronger case for the compatibility claim by Dalla Pozza and Garola. Some indications for this line of research are in [6, 5] , but we will not consider them here and limit ourselves to the intuitionistic fragment.
The pragmatic system as a framework for AI
In [2] the system of formal pragmatics has been given a Gentzen-style sequent calculus presentation and also developed to provide a mathematically principled approach to Artificial Intelligence applications.
Consider the problem of axiomatizing the foundations of laws, or more generally, of representing legal reasoning within a normative system. A sequent calculus for intuitionistic logic extended with an intuitionistic deontic modality would not suffice to formalize actual normative systems. For instance, according to Kelsen's theory [11] a typical norm occurring in a normative system could be formalized by an axiom 1 where represents an illicit act and an appropriate sanction. The axiom expresses the obligation for a judge to inflict the sanction in case conclusive evidence has been gathered that the illicit act has been performed. A formalization of the connective of causal implication is itself a difficult and controversial issue, let alone the production of a mixed system involving causality. The only possible choice at this stage was to axiomatize some features of causal implication, as they result from an analysis of very specific uses, namely, extensionality and relevance. According to the interpretation in [2] The paper [2] presents a mixed relevant and intuitionistic sequent calculus ILP for the intuitionistic fragment of the pragmatic system with operators for assertion, obligation and causal implication and gives a syntactic proof of consistency of the system, as a corollary of the cut-elimination theorem.
Adding the pragmatic connective of causal implication to the language raises several issues. Is there a distinction between expressive and descriptive use of causal implication? Can we say that c expresses a different act from , depending on whether the method leading from a justification of to the justification of is causal or not? What Kripke semantics shall we assign to the descriptive use of causal implication? We cannot discuss these philosophical issues here. To interpret causal implication we shall choose the monoidal semantics for relevant implication originally due to Urquhart [17] , but we are aware that this choice is not the only one possible. Such a choice has the consequence of bringing the mixed system for formal pragmatics close to mixed systems for intuitionistic and linear implication, such as Girard's LU [10] and Pym and O'Hearn's BI [15] (perhaps closer to the former than to the latter). The restrictions on the uses of causal implication clearly makes our system a very small fragment of such general mixed systems. For this reason and others, comparing our approach with theirs is clearly beyond the scope of this paper.
Basic ideas of the present work
The aim of this paper is to give a Kripke-style semantics to the sequent calculus ILP which formalizes the principles of the intuitionistic logic of pragmatics explained above.
As explained above, the Kripke-style semantics is not given to the pragmatic operators of in their expressive use, but to their descriptive counterpart. Thus with respect to the presentation in [2] we extend the radical formulas at the semantic level with the new connectives for the S4 modality, for the KD modality, for relevant implication and for absurdity. As already suggested in [13] for intuitionistic logic the completeness of the intuitionistic logic of pragmatics is obtained by the completeness of the interpreted formulas with respect to the given Kripke-style semantics and by the existence of the interpretation.
In order to show the completeness theorem we give a proof-search procedure and a procedure that constructs finite counter-models if the sequent is not provable. For the proof-search procedure we consider only proofs in particular form, called canonical proofs: the advantage of canonical proofs is that we can use one of the well known proof-search procedures for intuitionistic propositional logic which must only be extended to deal with the connectives for assertability, obligation and causal implication. Also the procedure that constructs countermodels for unprovable sequents extends procedures for intuitionistic propositional logic. As a consequence of this the finite model property follows from the finiteness of the countermodels for propositional intuitionistic logic. From the fact that the proof-search procedure considers only canonical proofs, which are in particular cut-free proofs, it follows that we can give a new proof of cut elimination.
The paper is structured in the following way. In Section 2 we introduce the pragmatic language and the sequent calculus ILP given in [2] . Furthermore, we extend the radical part of the language and define an interpretation of sentential formulas in the extended radical part. Then, in Section 3 we define the Kripke-style semantics for the formulas of the extended radical part which is based on the Kripke semantics of modal [12, 3] and relevant logic [17] . Furthermore, we show the soundness theorem. Finally, in Section 4 we give a proof-search procedure with respect to proofs in canonical form and a procedure to construct countermodels. In this way we show the completeness theorem, decidability of ILP, finite model property and cut elimination. The intuitionistic fragment of the language is obtained by restricting the class of elementary formulas to those with atomic radical only.
We consider an extended version of the pragmatic language in which we extend the radical part of the language with the modal operators and , the connective and the logical constant . In order to model relevant logic we need also the connective and the logical constant 1 where and 1 stand for tensor product and identity of the tensor product, respectively. Thus the radical formulas of which are denoted with are of the following form.
1
We project the formulas of the intuitionistic fragment of the pragmatic language into the extended radical part of the extended pragmatic language as represented in Figure 1 . This extends the Gödel [9] , McKinsey and Tarski [14] modal interpretation of intuitionistic propositional logic with the KD modality for norms and the relevant implication for causality.
Sequent calculus
The sequent calculus ILP formalizes derivations of sentential formulas of the intuitionistic fragment of the pragmatic language . Let and denote finite multisets of sentential formulas. We write Z for the nonempty multiset , A for the nonempty multiset and A for the nonempty multiset Note that the antecedent of the sequents has two areas, the relevant area on the left and the pragmatic area on the right of the semicolon. As a consequence of this there are only positive occurrences of causal implications and causal implications are not derivable from an absurdity.
We specify now briefly some useful properties of the sequent calculus ILP which represents the basic ideas underlying the decision procedure given in Section 4.1. Note that we consider the proof of a sequent as a tree where the sequents form the nodes and the instances of rules induce the edges between the nodes. Furthermore, we suppose that the final sequent of the proof is the root of the tree.
is provable without cuts in ILP if and only if there exists a proof of it such that all occurrences of the c rule have as left premiss an instance of the logical axiom .
PROOF. Note that in the left subtree there can occur only instances of c or rules. Suppose that the left premiss of an c rule is the conclusion of an c rule. We can permute the order of the rules in the following way. We say that a cut-free proof is in quasi-canonical form if every path from the leaves to the root can be split into three subpaths such that the following conditions are satisfied. 
Note that for quasi-canonical proofs we have that the pragmatic area of occurrences of the and c rules is empty. Furthermore, for proofs in ILP we have that in the same branch there can never be an instance of the c and an instance of the c rule.
DEFINITION 2.4 (canonical proof)
We say that a proof in quasi-canonical form is in canonical form if in every path from the leaves to the root all the instances of the and c rules occur before the instances of the c rule or the instance of the c rule.
It is easy to see that every cut-free proof in ILP can be transformed in a proof in quasicanonical form by permuting the order of the rules. We can also show that every proof in quasi-canonical form can be transformed in a proof in canonical form by permuting the order of the rules. As a consequence we have the following 
Kripke-style semantics
Kripke models
We use the modal interpretation of sentential formulas given in Section 2.1 and give a Kripkestyle semantic to the extended radical part of the extended pragmatic language which combines and extends the Kripke semantics of modal [12, 3] and relevant logic [17] . 
Validity and soundness
Suppose that and . Let and denote and 1, respectively. A sequent can then be seen as i.e. the semicolon and the commas in the relevant area are interpreted as tensor products, whereas the commas in the pragmatic area are interpreted as classical conjunctions. The other cases are similiar and left to the reader.
DEFINITION 3.4 (validity)
A
Completeness
Proof-search procedure
The following remarks are an immediate consequence of the properties of the sequent calculus ILP given in Section 2.2.
1. If the left premiss of the c rule is an instance of the logical axiom then we never need to split the context when we consider a c rule in the proof-search procedure.
2. If we deal only with proofs in quasi-canonical form then we can consider the sequent calculus ILP as an intuitionistic sequent calculus where the atomic formulas are of the form or . Thus we can apply one of the well-known proof-search procedures for intuitionistic propositional logic and need only to consider its extension to the relevant case. Note that we can absorb the structural rules in the pragmatic area of ILP in order to obtain a sequent calculus with the same properties as G3i [16] for which we have immediately a proof-search procedure because the rules can be read bottom-up. Furthermore we can use the technique described in [7] to make the proof-search procedure loop-free.
3. If we deal only with proofs in canonical form then the proof-search procedure for the extension to the relevant case is determined by the order in which the rules are applied in the ILP-proof.
Following these guidelines we describe a proof-search procedure which determines whether there exists a proof in canonical form. As explained above we can apply a terminating proofsearch procedure for intuitionistic propositional logic which works only in the pragmatic area and in the succedent of the sequent. If this procedure fails in finding a proof then we are left with a certain number of sequents which occur at the leaves of the search tree and which are not of the form or or . We call the sequents at the leaves initial sequents of the extension to the relevant case. Note that in an initial sequent is of the form or . We can now apply to every initial sequent the following procedure which determines if it is provable or not.
We denote with the multiset from which we have deleted all formulas with pragmatic connectives and consider the set of all multisets (including the empty one) of formulas contained in . Because we don't know which formulas should be introduced in the pragmatic area by the permeability rule in order to achieve provability, we consider the sequents for each . If at least one of these sequents is provable then the initial sequent is provable. Note that if a sequent is provable with respect to a certain multiset then the formulas which occur in but not in can be introduced in the pragmatic area by the weakening rule . Furthermore, we use the square brackets to collect the analysed formulas in order to detect hidden contraction rules (see steps (PS2.c) and (PS2.d) and Example 4.1 below). . If A or Z is empty, then we don't apply the rule and stop the construction of the search tree for this sequent.
PS2. We construct now a search tree starting from the sequent obtained by step (PS1). Suppose that after a certain number of steps in the construction the search tree has se-of occurrences of step (PS2.c) and of step (PS2.d) in the left branch coincides exactly with the number of occurrences of the contraction rule in the proof. The use of square brackets permits one to determine contractions but it is also the source of looping.
The procedure for the initial sequents explained above considers all possible cases. Thus we are able to decide if an initial sequent is provable or not. We can show by induction on the cardinality of the multiset that the procedure is also terminating. The crucial step in the proof is that if the cardinality of doesn't decrease, i.e.
for some constant , then after a certain number of steps there will be a loop because there is only a finite number of subformulas of formulas in and in and the procedure continues to analyse the same formulas.
So we can use the information obtained by the procedure for the initial sequents of the extension to the relevant case in the proof-search procedure for propositional intuitionistic logic. By the decidability of propositional intuitionistic logic [4] we have the following THEOREM 4.3 (decidability) To determine whether there exists a proof in canonical form of a sequent is decidable.
Counter-models
If the proof-search procedure explained in the previous section determines that there is no proof in canonical form of the sequent then we can construct a counter-model for this sequent. The following facts explain the basic ideas and semantical motivations which occur in the construction of the counter-model.
F1. In order to refute
we need a possible world such that and different possible worlds such that for each formula in the multiset . It follows that by the reflexivity of the accessibility relation . In order to ensure that we need different possible worlds such that for each formula added to the relevant area by step (PS1.a) of the extension of the proof-search procedure. Otherwise it could happen that causal implications in are satisfied vacuously. F2. Each possible world of the counter-model which forces a formula comprising formulas occuring in the pragmatic area has to be such that , where is the identity of the preordered monoid, because 1 is a subformula of . Note that the multiset is shifted from the pragmatic to the relevant area, thus there exists a possible world such that and for each . Therefore can equally be interpreted 3 3 In a system like Girard's LU [10] where sequents have mixed linear and intuitionistic contexts the permeability rule is based upon the fundamental principle of linear logic . In sequents with relevant and intuitionistic contexts where the contraction rule is available everywhere it suffices to have 1 1 1 . . The same argument applies also to step (PS2.c) and (PS2.d).
Starting from these facts we construct now a finite Kripke frame and define then a forcing relation such that we obtain a finite counter-model of the sequent .
KF1. Suppose that we have a set of possible worlds together with an accessibility relation obtained from the proof-search procedure for intuitionistic propositional logic by the usual way. We know that intuitionistic propositional logic satisfies the finite model property [4] , thus we suppose that is finite. Let denote the root of the intuitionistic refutation tree. We define the set of possible worlds of the Kripke frame as and extend the accessibility relation on with and its reflexive and transitive closure to an accessibility relation on . Furthermore, we endow the preordered set with an idempotent and commutative operation and extend it to a monoid : if then . Note that as a consequence of these definitions we have that the properties (3a), (3b), (3c) and (3d) of the definition of Kripke model are satisfied.
LEMMA 4.9 Every finitely generated commutative semigroup with an idempotent operation is finite.
PROOF. By commutativity and idempotence every element of has the form where are generators.
LEMMA 4.10
The preordered monoid , the semigroup , the operation and the relation defined above form a Kripke frame . Furthermore, the Kripke frame is finite.
PROOF. That is a Kripke frame follows from the above definitions. and are finitely generated. Thus they are finite by Lemma 4.9. 
FIGURE 5. Example of a Kripke frame
From the extension of the proof-search procedure to the relevant case we know that we have to consider also the sets of possible worlds and . Figure 5 shows the Kripke frame obtained from these possible worlds and the accessibility relation of the intuitionistic refutation tree. Note that the nodes of the Kripke frame are equivalence classes of possible or virtuous worlds. In particular the following properties hold. The set of formulas and associated to each possible world and to each virtuous world , respectively, permits one to define the forcing relation for atomic formulas. Note, in particular, that without it wouldn't be possible to determine which atomic formulas must be forced in order to obtain a counter-model because it could happen that the decision procedure doesn't analyse all formulas of the form and (see Example 4.2). As an immediate consequence of the clauses of the forcing relation for extended radical formulas given in Figure 3 and of the facts F1, . . . , F7 given at the beginning of this section we have the following LEMMA 4.14 , but . PROOF. Suppose that and that the decision procedure determines that the sequent is not provable in ILP. Then we can construct a counter-model as explained above which contradicts the hypothesis that is valid. The other direction holds by the soundness theorem.
Completeness and cut elimination
Remember that proofs in canonical form are cut-free proofs. Thus as a consequence of the fact that the proof-search procedure determines whether there exists a proof in canonical form and the fact that the cut rules are sound with respect to the given Kripke-style semantics we obtain an alternative proof (which doesn't provide a procedure to transform proofs with cuts in cut-free proofs) of cut elimination with respect to the one given in [2] . THEOREM 4.18 (cut elimination) If a sequent is provable in ILP then it is provable without cuts.
